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Abstract 
In recent years, the emerged network worms and attacks have distributive characteristics, which can spread 
globally in a short time. Security management crossing network to co-defense network-wide attacks and 
improve the efficiency of security administration is urgently needed. This paper proposes a hierarchical 
distributed network security management system (HD-NSMS), which can centrally manage security across 
networks. First describes the system in macrostructure and microstructure; then discusses three key problems 
when building HD-NSMS: device model, alert mechanism, and emergency response mechanism; at last, it 
describes the implementation of HD-NSMS. The paper is valuable for implementing NSMS in that it derives from 
a practical network security management system (NSMS). 
Keywords: Network Security Management, Device Organization, Emergency Response 
1 Introduction 
The earliest research on NSMS can be pursued back to the Europe project SAMSON [1] in 1992, which performs 
the security management by integrating interfaces of CMIP and SNMP. Scholars in the world discussed widely 
on NSMS in each subsequent year. In 1997, F. Stamatelopoulos etc. implemented an integrated network security 
management system on UNIX machine by adopting SNMP protocol and using architecture of Manager/Agent 
[2]. In 1998, Philip C. Hyland etc. proposed a three-stage theory for network security management and built a 
security management framework named CSSA [3]. In 1999, Soon Choul Kim etc. built a NSMS based on 
architecture of Client/Server [4], which collects security information from each computer, analysis them and 
displays results to users. Between 2000 and 2002, K. Boudaoud etc. discussed NSMS [5] from perspective of 
multi-agent, and built a prototype. But its main goal is to promote the ability of intrusion detection. In 2005, J. 
Dawkins etc. built a prototype of NSMS [6], which identifies, tracks and analyzes security events based on security 
information gotten from other detecting and scanning tools, and displays results to users in graph style. 
Above researches focus on single network security management, most of them didn’t involve cross network 
security management. However, requirement of security management crossing network is becoming more and 
more urgent lately. Because of that most of worms emerged in recent years have distributive characteristic, 
which can spread to worldwide in a very short time, and maybe derive from different networks and districts, 
these require extensive coordination in the procedure of tracing and defense. Cross network security 
management can meet the requirement well for that it is effective in defending network-wide attacks and 
managing security by the means of integrated management and cross-network cooperation when handling 
events, policies and vulnerabilities. 
In the period of 2004~2006, we implemented a HD-NSMS that can execute cross network management, and 
mainly included five main functions: status monitor, event management, policy management, vulnerability 
management and security situation evaluation. On basis of the practical research and development, section 2 of 
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the paper describes the system in macrostructure and microstructure; section 3 discusses three key problems 
when building HD-NSMS: device model, alert mechanism and emergency response mechanism; section 4 
describes the implementation of HD-NSMS. 
 
2 Architecture 
HD-NSMS is a complicated system, whose architecture has to be described from both macro level and micro 
level. 
2.1 Macro Architecture 
HD-NSMS aims at protecting network of large-scale organization, which has three characteristics in general: 
hierarchical, distributed and dendriform, it is shown in Figure 1. Correspondingly, HD-NSMS should have 
consistent macro  architecture with  organizational network structure in macro level. Therefore, HD-NSMS is 
composed of a number of nodes. Each node is named as “security management node”(SMN)，which is 
responsible for centralized security management in local network and its descendent networks. Corresponding 
to organization’s network, all of the SMNs construct a tree like structure. 
As there are notable differences between managing device and SMN, SMN can be divided into two classes: 
Intranet SMN (ISMN) and Extranet SMN (ESMN). ISMN manage device, and ESMN manage SMN. Hence, two 
kinds of macro architecture can be built: Macro Architecture combining ISMN and ESMN (see Figure 2), Macro 
Architecture separating ISMN and ESMN (see Figure 3). Device in this paper means security related equipments, 
hosts or software. Devices can be divided into three classes: security device, network device and important hosts. 
Under the macro architecture separating ISMN and ESMN，ISMN is responsible for the tasks related to device, 
such as monitoring running status of device, receiving and handling security events from device , acquiring 
security policy from device and enforcing policy to device. ESMN can fulfill security management in a larger 
network under the support of lower ISMN and ESMN, such as analyzing security events, computing security 
situation, and distributing security policies and patches etc. Although this architecture divides works of ISMN 
and ESMN clearly, the cost of developing and maintaining such kind of management system is high. Besides 
that, the whole system will be complicated for that it comprises two types of SMN. 
Under the merged architecture, there is only one type of SMN, which manages both device and SMN. As this 
architecture regards SMN as a special device, the structure of the HD-NSMS looks simple, and the cost of 
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development and maintenance is low. Therefore, we choose the architecture combining ISMN and ESMN for 
our HD-NSMS. 
 
2.2 Micro Architecture 
Diversity is an important characteristic of NSMS, which includes platform diversity, device type diversity, 
manufacturer diversity and information structure diversity. How to merge all of these together and at the same 
time guarantee high performance, reliability, security and scalability of the system is not easy to resolve. The 
best way to resolve such problem is adopting method of layered abstraction. So, we abstract micro architecture 
of HD-NSMS into five-layer depicted in Figure 4. 
The ground layer is DIL (Device Interface Layer), which acquires and configures directly various data or files on 
device, masks differences and details of device operations and data derived from different manufacturers, and 
provides unified device operations and data interfaces for upper layer. 
The second layer is CCL (Common Communication Layer), which is responsible for communication between 
agents and SMN, between user console and SMN, and between SMN and SMN. This kind of communication 
includes communication in local network or across wide area network. Besides that, encryption, certification, 
speed control, reliability, priority control and time synchronization all are involved in. Providing unified 
communication interface to SMN, agent and user console is also concerned. 
The third layer is DLL (Device Logic Layer), which is responsible for maintaining device topology in SMN, masking 
some details such as device type or location etc, and providing more abstract device operations for upper layer. 
The fourth layer is FLL (Function Logic Layer), which helps to implement SMN functions of device status 
monitoring, events management, policy management, vulnerability management and security situation 
evaluation. 
The top layer is UIL (User Interface Level), which runs on user console. It interacts with users directly in graph 
style, and sends user commands and data to FLL. 
Building NSMS based on the layered-abstraction idea has merits of that it can merge all devices of different 
types or from different manufactures together conveniently. It is also convenient to add new functions into 
NSMS. Moreover, the architecture is clear and east to maintain. The micro-architecture is built as Figure 5, which 
is divided into four independent parts: Security Management Node (SMN), Device Agent (DA), User Console 
(UC) and Common Communication Server (CCS). These four parts correspond to above five-layer structure. 
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DA is composed of Device Interface module and DA Kernel module. Both of them belong to DIL. Device Interface 
module communicates directly with device through several kinds of protocols, which includes SNMP, CMIP, 
syslog, manufacturer specific protocols, customed protocols or directly accessing. By these protocols, the 
module can complete operations of getting or setting device status, getting or setting device policy, etc. DA 
Kernel receives and explains commands from SMN, and performs required operations on device through device 
interface module. At the same time, it receives alerts and status information from device, transforms them into 
uniform formats and sends them to SMN through CCS. 
Common Communication is composed of communication library and CCS，and belongs to CCL. 
Communication library is attached to SMN, DA and UC，implements communication protocol stack, multi-
threads parallelization and multi-level cache etc. CCS is an independently running program, mainly responsible 
for encryption/decryption, cross-network speed control, asynchronous storage and routing of communication. 
SMN is the kernel of HD-NSMS and is composed of Device Module and Function Module. Device Module 
belongs to DLL, it maintains devices’ logical topology, attaches device attributes for information sending out, 
explains device attributes for information receiving in. Function module belongs to FLL, performs functions of 
SMN, and manages parallel asynchronous information. Except of managing devices in local network, SMN also 
communicates with other SMNs, regards descendent SMN as its own devices, and regards itself as superior 
SMN’s device. 
UC Kernel and UI Module belong to UIL. They are responsible for user interaction. UI Module is a graphical 
interface. UC Kernel creates and sends user commands, receives and explains alert and status information, and 
maintains device topology in user view. 
3 Key Issues 
3.1 Device Model 
Device is the key object of HD-NSMS, and the five functions of HD-NSMS all are relative to device, so building 
reasonable device model is very important. The process of building device model is divided into three steps of 
addressing, abstraction and organization. 
3.1.1 Device Addressing 
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HD-NSMS is a typical large-scale distributed communication system. Network communication is required 
between all device agents and SMN. Therefore, uniform addressing is necessary for identifying each 
communication node uniquely in whole HD-NSMS. 
The addressing method of HD-NSMS should satisfy two requirements: uniqueness and locatability. Uniqueness 
means identifying a node uniquely in the macro tree structure of HD-NSMS, even if two nodes are located in 
the same LAN or on the same machine; Locatability means the logical location of a node in the macro structure 
tree of HD-NSMS can be ascertained. In other words, the level, sub-tree or number of any node can be 
ascertained. 
For identifying a communication node, IP address is a typical example, which can identify a machine on the 
Internet uniquely. But, if HD-NSMS uses IP for identification, there will be some problems difficult to resolve: 
How to ascertain the logical position of a node in HD-NSMS’ macro structure tree by using IP address? How to 
differentiate each node while several communication nodes share one IP address? Hence, IP address isn’t 
appropriate for HD-NSMS addressing. 
We designed a new addressing method. It assumes n and d as depth and degree of HD-NSMS’ macro 
architecture tree, represents address of a node as following string: 
A1.A2.A3…. An 0≤Ai≤d 1≤i≤n 
The node address string is composed of several segments separated by dots. The amount of segments is equal 
to the depth or total levels of macro structure tree. Each segment describes number of the node under its parent 
node. For example, there is a node that has address as 1.2.4.0.0.0.0.0, which means the HD-NSMS has eight 
levels in total and this node is a 3rd level node. The number of this node in level 1 is 1, level 2 is 2, and level 3 is 
4. The numbers below level 3 all are zero, which indicates level of the node is 3. This addressing method meets 
above two requirements well for that an address can represent a HD-NSMS node’s logical position and identify 
it uniquely. 
We illustrate HD-NSMS addressing method by using the network structure in Figure 1. Left part of figure 6 for 
merged macro architecture, right part for separated macro architecture. 
Obviously, all nodes in HD-NSMS construct a tree. Each node in the tree represents a device and has an address. 
We name such tree as Addressed Device Tree. In the Addressed Device Tree, there are only two kinds of nodes: 
SMN node and Device node. Only SMN node can be a non-leave node. 
For any node in Addressed Device Tree, the algorithm complexity of searching a node from the root is O (n), 
which n is depth of the node in the tree. In the case of numberless tree, the algorithm complexity should be O 
(n*d), which d is degree of the node. So Addressed Device Tree is efficient on performing operations of search, 
add and delete. 
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3.1.2 Device Abstraction 
We abstract device both statically and dynamically. Static abstraction regards security device, network device, 
host machine and SMN as a uniform device object which has attributes of device type, operations and properties. 
Device object is the kernel data structure of the whole HD-NSMS, we describes it by UML in Figure 7. Firstly, we 
define a super class named Device, which includes basic information about device and related operations; then, 
define each specified device object which includes attributes of device’ running status, latest events list and 
corresponding handling functions. Specific device object involves FWDevice, IDSDevice, AVDevice, SCADevice, 
HMDevice and SMNDevice. 
In addition, for abstracting device dynamically, we describe a state transition diagram that contains ten statuses 
and twelve transfer conditions as shown in Figure 8. Ten status that pictured as nested circles include offline 
(S1); network disconnected (S11); device can’t arrive (S12); online (S2); waiting (S21); running normally (S211); 
running abnormally (S212); handling alert (S22); handling policy (S23); handling vulnerability (S24). Twelve 
transfer conditions include receiving network test package (T1); overtime when waiting network test package 
(T2); receiving device state package (T3); overtime when waiting device state package (T4); device abnormity of 
CPU, memory, disk, network flow or key process (T5); device normality of CPU, memory, disk, network flow or 
key process (T6); receiving device alert (T7); finishing handling alert (T8); receiving policy handling command 
(T9); finishing handling policy command (T10); receiving vulnerability handling command (T11); finishing 
handling vulnerability command (T12). 
3.1.3 Device Organization 
Device organization should reflect topology of physical devices in reality, and convenient for perform any 
computation. Besides, device organization should be displayed in visualized way for users to understand and 
operate. Therefore, we propose a three mapping model for device organization: physical view, virtual view and 
user view. 
• Physical View: a device topology that describes how the physical devices are connected in reality. 
• Virtual View: a mapping of the physical view in memory. It also can be regarded as a topology of abstracted 
device objects. A device in virtual view is a logical abstraction of the corresponding physical device. Virtual 
view is the kernel of three layers and computational foundation for five functions of HD-NSMS. 
• User View: a mapping of virtual view on user interface. It also shows the result of user operation. Devices 
in user view are different from those in virtual view. User View describes position, size, icon, alert and sounds 
of device objects in user interface. It not only can map virtual view, but also can modify virtual view in 
return. 
Essentially, virtual view and user view are Addressed Device Tree composed of abstract devices. Virtual view and 
user view have to change dynamically for mapping updates of physical device or making user operation 
conveniently. Possible changes in virtual view include: building, assembling and disassembling tree, adding and 
deleting device, modifying and switching status. Possible changes in user view include: building, destroying, 
assembling, disassembling, expanding and shrinking tree; adding and deleting device; modifying and switching 
status. Before introducing the algorithm of dynamical changing, two concepts need to be defined: 
Device Tree’s Embedding Structure: a data structure for encapsulating Addressed Device Tree, used in 
transmitting the Addressed Device Tree between virtual view and user view, and between upper SMN and lower 
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SMN. Device tree’s embedding structure and Addressed Device Tree can convert reciprocally. It describes each 
device in following format: 
[DeviceId:DeviceState:Child1:Child2:Child3……] 
Then, the device tree in left of Figure 6 can be represented as: 
[1.0.0.0:state:[1.1.0.0:state:[1.1.1.0:state:[1.1.1.1:state]:[1.1.1.2:state]:[ 1.1.1.3:state]]:[ 1.1.2.0:stat e]]:[ 1.2.0.0:state:[ 
1.2.1.0:state]:[ 1.2.2.0:state:[ 1.2.2.1:state]:[ 1.2.2.2:state]]]] 
View Mapping Thread: a daemon thread running on SMN and UC. Under the help of Device Tree’s Embedding 
Structure, it may implement mapping between virtual view and user view, which is illustrated in Figure 9. 
For an administrator of SMN, he/she only knows number, status and other information of direct subordinate 
devices. It is difficult for him/her to fill the information of indirect subordinate devices, because indirect 
subordinate devices maybe locate in remote place geographically. Therefore, we introduce assembling and 
disassembling algorithms to update automatically of subordinate device tree. 
Assembling algorithm can assemble the device tree’s embedding structure under the main tree and update the 
mapping onto user view. The assembling algorithm is given out as Figure 10. If subordinate SMN doesn’t send 
information for a long time, it is considered offline or network failure. At this time, its subordinate sub-tree 
should be disassembled. The disassembling algorithm is given out as Figure 11. 
Assembling algorithm: 
Parameter: device tree’s embedding structure 
1) call algorithm of building tree to transform device tree’s embedding structure to a subtree preparing 
for assembling; 
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2) search in main tree the assembling node that is the same as root node of the subtree; 
3) add root node of the subtree into children device group of parent node of the assembling node; 
4) set parent of the assembling node as parent of root node of the subtree; 
5) delete the assembling node from its parent’s children device group; 
6) free the assembling node in virtual view; 
7) send new device tree to user view by mapping thread; 
8) find assembling node in main tree of the user view; 
9) update state of the assembling node according to root node of the subtree; 
10) by using an search algorithm of depth precedence, add every node of subtree circularly under the 
assembling node in user view; 
11) update user view; 
Disassembling algorithm: 
Parameter: disassembling node 
1) find the disassembling node in main tree of virtual view; 
2) modify state of the disassembling node; 
3) by using an search algorithm of depth precedence, delete every descendent nodes of the disassembling 
node; 
4) send new device tree to user view by mapping thread; 
5) find the disassembling node in main tree of user view; 
6) update state of the disassembling node in user view; 
7) by using an search algorithm of depth precedence, delete circularly every descendent node of the 
disassembling node; 
8) update user view; 
3.2 Alert Mechanism 
Objective of alert mechanism is integrating events and disclosing relations among events. In recent years, a lot 
of research has been done in this field [9~13], but most of them keep eyes on intrusion detection and doesn’t 
involve relation analysis across different type of devices. Generally, they don’t treat differently on events from 
different type of devices and seldom associate the events based on inner relationship of events from different 
type of devices. Cross-device event-association is an inevitable problem that has to be solved for building HD-
NSMS. Our alert mechanism is described in Figure 12. 
DA accomplishes single-device event handling. Filter module of DA removes useless events coming from 
Firewall, IDS and Host Monitor etc. Even in the case of no attacks happen useless events may be generated 
largely, paper [15] proves this, so filtering is necessary. Single device aggregation module merges repeated 
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events, ports scanning events, host monitoring events and DOS events. The normalization module converts each 
device event into a uniform XML format satisfying the requirements of IDMEF，and prepares to cross-device 
aggregation. 
SMN accomplishes cross-device event handling. Validation module of SMN rates normalized events that 
received from DA and filters the lowest events, rating event lies on value loss computed from value and 
vulnerabilities of information asset who is attack target of the event. Based on the event normalization, cross-
device aggregating module aggregates events from multiple types of devices by uses a similarity function that 
has the form as in paper [16]. Session association module associates events belonged to the same network 
session into a session alert, and send the alert to UC. 
Session alert means aggregation of all related events during one network connection. These events surely 
belong to one attack and have strong relation between each other. Session alert is composed of session 
information and event queue. Session information mainly describes the source and destination address, start 
and stop time of the session. Events queue means events sorted by time and is useful for administrator to 
analyze the attacker’s intention. 
The key to build session alert is finding the events of connection and disconnection. The events can be sort out 
from firewall logs as the reason of that firewall monitors all kinds of connections, which surely contains 
connections of attack. For connection-oriented protocols, we can easily get connection and disconnection 
events; for non-connection-oriented protocols, we also can get the events in that most firewalls support stateful-
inspection technology who can treat non-connection-oriented protocol as having connection [14]. 
Each session alert has a session alert object in SMN memory, the object has an internal event queue, and the 
session alert is generated from the first non-connection event and destroyed when the connection is closed. At 
the same time, there is a global event queue for recording beginning time of each connection. Left of following 
describes session association algorithm, and right of following is an algorithm that deciding whether an event 
belongs to a session alert. 
Session alert supported event association mechanism has several advantages. First, it can complete association 
in 
real-time as a result of that association operation is done in memory and searching queue is short; Second, it 
uses network session as unit to cluster events instead of usual time window, because of that the events belonged 
to the same session have more tight relationships with each other than the events belonged to the same time 
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window; Third, it is easy to find out in-progress attack for that the session alert not ended indicates an in-
progress attack; Fourth, it is easy to linkage with firewall by session information. 
3.3 Emergency Response Mechanism 
At present, handling security emergency mostly depends on manual operation, so it imminently needs an 
automatic or semi-automatic mechanism. We design a semi-automatic emergency handling mechanism for HD-
NSMS, and the mechanism synthesizes three factors of flow, counterplan and cooperation. 
Flow means that the whole emergency response progress should comply with some normative flow. We design 
the emergency response flow in accordance with FCC drew Computer Security Incident Response Guide [8], 
which divides emergency response flow into six steps: Preparation, Identification, Containment, Eradication, 
Recovery and Follow-up. The steps of Preparation and Follow-up are not included in HD-NSMS by reason that 
these two steps are minor in handling emergency. 
Counterplan is a document that is written beforehand and saved in database, and it is used to guide event 
handling. Every event is associated with a counterplan. Counterplan consists of four sub-counterplans of 
identification, containment, eradication and recovery, which in accordance with the main four steps of 
emergency response flow. When administrator launches emergency response flow, HD-NSMS automatically 
sorts out corresponding counterplan and displays it to user interface.  
Cooperation means that HD-NSMS provides a mechanism for entire network’s SMN nodes to treat together 
important security event. For the local network that security incident occurred in, its SMN is the main participant 
for event handling. As the higher-level network administrator usually has better experience in security, he/she 
is regarded as the coordinator in whole handling progress. For wide range attacks or worms, HD-NSMS adopted 
other SMN into handling progress to implement cooperative defense. We use UML to describe the handling 
progress in Figure 13. 
 
 
4 Implementation 
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From 2004 to 2006, based on the previously described system structure, device model, alert mechanism and 
emergency response mechanism, we achieved an HD-NSMS system. Figure 14 depicts the hierarchical 
subsystems dependent relationship by method of UML. It ignores tool classes, supporting function classes and 
thread classes. Its layers basically correspond to the modules in Figure 5 that depicts microstructure of HD-
NSMS. 
DAKernel Layer and DevInt Layer correspond to the “DA Kernel” and “Device Interface” modules in Figure 5. 
DAEvent module in DAKernel Layer is responsible for filtering, single-device aggregating and normalizing event. 
CommCom Layer corresponds to the “Common Communication” module in Figure 5, and performs 
communications between SMNs and DAs. 
DBInt Layer provides unified DB operations for other modules. 
DevTopo Layer corresponds to the “Device Modules” in Figure 5. Five subsystems of IDSDevice, FWDevice, 
AVDevice, ScannerDevice and HMDevice manage respectively five types device of IDS, firewall, anti-virus, 
scanner and host-monitoring system. SMN is abstracted as device object and managed by SMNDevice module. 
DeviceManager is the external interface of DevTopo Layer, and implements maintenance operations on logic 
topology of devices.  
Function layer corresponds to the “Function Modules” in Figure 5. Five subsystems of State, Event, Policy, 
Vulnerability and Assessment archive respectively five functions of HD-NSMS. HandleLib module handles 
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asynchronously the input packages. SessionManager module manages session queue and runs session 
monitoring thread. Event module is responsible for verifying, cross-device aggregating, associating and handling 
events, and implements the emergency response mechanism. 
UI Layer and UIKernel Layer correspond to the “UI Modules” and “UC Kernel” module in Figure 5. Figure 15 
shows a device topology in User Console of HD-NSMS. 
5 Related Work 
Compare to the related works [1~6], this paper innovatively builds a hierarchical distributed NSMS that can 
manage security in a Hierarchical distributed network. Though, there are several kinds of NSMS architectures, 
such as Manager/Agent [2], Client/Server [4] and Multi-Agent [5], they mainly focus on single-network security 
management, they can’t manage policy, event or vulnerability in a cross-network environment. 
6 Conclusion 
We promote architecture of HD-NSMS, and discuss three key problems in building HD-NSMS, which are device 
model, alert mechanism and emergency response. We describe the architecture from macrostructure and 
microstructure. Macrostructure has two kinds which both have advantages and disadvantages, one is ISMN and 
ESMN combined architecture; another is ISMN and ESMN separated architecture. Microstructure is divided into 
five layers: user interface, function logic, device logic, common communication and device interface. This layered 
architecture can screen differences among device types, manufacturers, or data structures, and provide a unified 
security management interface to administrator. Using this five layers architecture, we can build a HD-NSMS 
that has good performance, dependability and extensibility. 
As device is kernel object of a NSMS, we build a device model from respects of identifying, abstracting and 
organizing. For identifying device, we design a device addressing method that codes device address in a string, 
which composed of several numbers and separated by dot. For abstracting device, we use UML to describe 
abstracted device objects, and depict state transition diagram of abstractive device object. For organizing device, 
we promote a three level mapping model that contains physical view, virtual view and user view, physical view 
is a topology graph of physical devices; virtual view is mapped from physical view and exists in main memory; 
user view is mapped from virtual view and exists in GUI. In order to build the virtual view and user view of whole 
network in real time, we depict assembling algorithm that add devices of lower level network into the views, and 
depict disassembling algorithm that clean devices of lower level network from the views. 
For alert mechanism, we promote a new event-association method based on session alert. We cluster all alerts 
that related to the same network connection into a session alert, because these events surely belong to the 
same attack, and can help administrator to analyze attack intent. The beginning and ending time of the network 
connection can be identified by the firewall event of building and destroying connection. Compare to paper [9] 
and [11], event-association method of this paper considers internal relations among events that generated from 
different types of devices, i.e. relation among firewall event and other device’s event. Compare to paper [10], 
the associating method of this paper can do associating work in real time. 
As currently people often do cross-network emergency response manually, we build a semi-automatic 
mechanism for cross-network emergency response. The mechanism considers three factors of emergency 
handing flow, counterplan and cooperative operation, can be used by administrators on different locations to 
cooperatively handle emergency. 
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